Australia’s top 20 stocks – the price of conformity

The ASX’s biggest stocks trade at extraordinary premiums as small industrials de-rate. Blame incentives, not fundamentals.
Marcus Burns

Spheria Asset Management

There is an old investment adage that says the greatest risk is not necessarily owning a poor business, but paying too much for a good one. That distinction is particularly relevant to today’s Australian equity market. Australia’s 20 largest listed companies now command valuations that are difficult to reconcile with either their international peers or their underlying earnings growth. Smaller industrial companies have experienced almost the opposite: their valuations have compressed, and they now trade at a discount to the largest industrials.

The result is one of the most striking valuation divergences in the Australian market in more than a decade. It raises an uncomfortable question: are investors allocating capital to the best opportunities, or simply where they are required to in order to conform to the lowest benchmark risk? Remember - no one gets fired for buying IBM.

When quality becomes expensive

On FY27 consensus earnings, the ASX’s largest 20 companies trade at approximately 17.8x earnings, compared with just 12.4x for a closely matched group of international peers. This represents a 44% valuation premium to the closest international peers.

Consider Commonwealth Bank, trading at around 25x forward earnings – on earnings analysts expect to grow by less than 2% next year (according to Bloomberg consensus numbers) – against approximately 12x for comparable banks in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. Or Telstra at 22.7x, which commands more than twice the earnings multiple of international telecommunications operators such as Verizon, AT&T and Deutsche Telekom. No doubt these are established businesses with valuable franchises. But are they really worth twice as much for every dollar of earnings? History suggests investors have not always thought so.

In January 2016, Australia’s top 20 companies traded at an 8% discount to the same international peer group. Over the subsequent decade their average premium was approximately 21% and today that premium, at around 44%, has reached its highest level in ten years. The businesses have not suddenly become twice as good. Investors have simply become willing to pay substantially more to own them.

A remarkable disconnect between earnings and returns

Perhaps the clearest evidence of this divergence emerges when we compare investment returns with the growth in underlying corporate earnings.

Since June 2021, when the Your Future, Your Super (YFYS) reforms were introduced, the S&P/ASX 20 Accumulation Index has returned approximately 60%. Over that same period, the index’s consensus forward earnings per share have increased by just 10%. The forward price-to-earnings multiple has expanded from 16.1x to 18.5x. In other words, investors have enjoyed substantial returns despite relatively modest earnings growth and assisted by higher valuations and dividends. And the outlook is thinner still: consensus expects ASX 20 earnings to grow about 2% over the next year.

Now consider the smaller end of the market. The Small Ordinaries trades on 15.4x forward earnings, a 17% discount to the ASX 20. A dollar invested in it twenty years ago is now worth less than half a dollar invested in the ASX 100 – the widest gap at any point in those two decades. But resources now make up more than a third of that index, and their cycle-driven multiples blur the picture. 

ASX 20 vs Small Ordinaries: Returns and earnings growth

The real story is in small industrials.

Five years ago, small industrials traded on more than 23x forward earnings a premium of over 40% to the ASX 20. That premium has vanished like a pre-election promise. Today on around 18 x they trade at a 12% discount to the ASX 20’s own industrial companies and close to 20% once banks are excluded. The difference has been driven less by what businesses have earned than by what investors have been prepared to pay for those earnings.

Admittedly small industrials entered this period on elevated valuations and with the cash rate rising from 0.10% to over 4%, some subsequent de-rating was inevitable. But that observation alone does not explain the divergence. The largest companies faced the same rate cycle and their multiples went up, not down. What separated them was not the cost of money but the rules governing where Australia’s retirement savings must go.

The valuation relationship has turned upside down

A discount means nothing if growth is the price of admission. It isn’t. Analysts expect small industrial earnings to grow about 20% next year against roughly 5% for the ASX 20’s industrials and 2% for the ASX 20 as a whole. Take the scissors to that 20% – small-cap forecasts are famously optimistic, and over the past decade they’ve been cut by about 13% on average – and small industrials still grow as fast as the giants. Same growth. Lower price.

Investors can now access a universe of smaller industrial businesses at a meaningful discount to Australia’s largest companies, with comparable growth prospects even on sceptical assumptions.

Such opportunities are unusual – the more interesting question is why they exist.

"Show me the incentive and I will show you the outcome"
– Charlie Munger

John Maynard Keynes understood the institutional pressures shaping investment decisions long before index funds and superannuation performance tests existed. In The General Theory (1936), he observed:

“Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”

Nearly ninety years later, the observation remains remarkably relevant. Australia’s YFYS reforms introduced a performance test that measures superannuation funds against prescribed benchmarks. Funds that fail the test in two consecutive years face the significant consequence of being closed to new members. The intention was sensible: improve accountability and protect retirement savings from persistent underperformance. The unintended consequences, however, are not. For a superannuation trustee, the career and commercial risks associated with materially underperforming a benchmark are considerable.

The most rational response is to minimise tracking error by holding portfolios that resemble the benchmark. Australia’s major indices are heavily concentrated in a relatively small number of companies, which only reinforces demand for the dominant stocks.

What is rational for an individual fund can become problematic when replicated across an entire industry.

The benchmark ceases to be merely a measure of investment performance and becomes simply a target for capital allocation.

Treasury now concedes the problem. Its May 2026 consultation paper on reforming the performance test notes concerns that the test encourages ‘benchmark hugging’, as trustees invest closer to the index to avoid failing. The funds themselves agree: Rest, a $105 billion fund, told Treasury the test clearly constrains its investment decisions.

We are not suggesting however, that YFYS alone explains the valuation divergence. Passive investment flows, interest rates, liquidity preferences and international demand have also influenced Australian equity valuations. Nevertheless, benchmark-relative incentives provide a compelling explanation for why valuation disparities can persist long after fundamentals suggest they should narrow. The irony is difficult to ignore. A regulatory framework designed to improve investment outcomes may also be contributing to a large distortion in the market, creating undue concentration and thus risk.

The opportunity created by the crowd

Charles Mackay, writing about speculative manias in 1841, observed:

“Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that they go mad in herds, while they only recover their senses slowly, and one by one.”

Markets have repeatedly demonstrated that investor behaviour can be as important as business fundamentals in determining short-term returns. But over longer periods, valuations matter. Cash flow is gravity – in the long run, the numbers get a vote. When one segment of the market has enjoyed substantial multiple expansion despite modest earnings growth, while another has experienced material multiple contraction, the implications for prospective returns deserve serious consideration.

Crowded trades don’t need a catalyst to unwind, only time. Valuation is the best long-run guide to future returns. When one part of the market has re-rated by about 15% on earnings growth of 10%, and another has de-rated by about 25% on earnings growth of 25%, the starting point for the next five years looks very different.

The opportunity lies in selection rather than the index. Investors willing to look beyond the benchmark can buy smaller companies with strong free cash flow, low leverage and growing earnings at a discount to the market’s giants. That is a rare setup, and it persists in part because the largest pools of capital in the country are, in effect, discouraged from taking advantage of it.

As Mark Twain is said to have written: 

“Whenever you find yourself on the side of the majority, it is time to pause and reflect.”


........
Sources: Bloomberg (S&P/ASX 20, ASX 100, Small Ordinaries, Small Industrials and Small Resources indices; 12-month blended forward consensus; gross total returns; market capitalisation at calendar year-ends and current), data to October 2026. International peer comparison on FY27 consensus. Treasury, Strengthening the superannuation performance test, consultation paper (May 2026). Rest submission to Treasury, as reported by Super Review (July 2026). Disclaimer Spheria Asset Management Pty Limited ('Spheria') (ABN 42‌ 611‌ 081‌ 326) is a Corporate Authorised Representative (No. 1240‌979) of Pinnacle Investment Management Limited ('PIML') (ABN 66 109 659 109, AFSL 322140). PIML is a wholly owned subsidiary of Pinnacle Investment Management Group Limited (‘Pinnacle’) (ABN 22 100 325 184). Livewire gives readers access to information and educational content provided by financial services professionals and companies ("Livewire Contributors"). Livewire does not operate under an Australian financial services licence and relies on the exemption available under section 911A(2)(eb) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in respect of any advice given. Any advice on this site is general in nature and does not take into consideration your objectives, financial situation or needs. Before making a decision please consider these and any relevant Product Disclosure Statement. Livewire has commercial relationships with some Livewire Contributors.

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Marcus Burns
Portfolio Manager
Spheria Asset Management

Marcus Burns is a portfolio manager at Spheria Asset Management and is a co-founder of the firm. He has managed Australian, European and global equity portfolios out of Australia and London through volatile market cycles for over 20 years. Marcus...

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