Is a stronger Yen just a matter of time?

Bank of Japan quantitative tightening has compressed the spread between Japanese and global bond yields, even as the Yen hits new lows.
James Halse, CFA

Senjin Capital

At around 163 to the USD, the Yen is as weak as it has been against the USD since the 1980s.

The general consensus is that the weakening trend is likely to continue. Reasons cited include Japan’s falling competitiveness due to a lack of productivity growth and increasing overcapacity in Chinese industry – resulting in an explosion of steel and electric vehicle exports, among other products. Similarly, Japan’s trade deficit is further hurt by the increased reliance on expensive energy imports since the Fukushima disaster resulted in the shutdown of nuclear power plants across Japan. Finally, Japan’s headline government debt to GDP is the highest in the developed world.

However, most of these dynamics have been in place for more than a decade, while China’s EV investment and export growth has been observable since 2022. The Yen traded as high as 113 to the USD in 2022.

In a recent article for Bloomberg, 1 Meryn Somerset Webb highlights just how cheap Japan is as a function of the Yen’s pricing. She writes:

“Renting an apartment in Tokyo will cost you only 25% of the same in New York. Buying one will cost half the price of one in London… That’s just the beginning of Japan’s low-cost living: A McDonald’s meal, should you insist on having one, will cost a quarter of the same repast in Tel Aviv”

The Yen weakened as rates rose elsewhere but stayed low in Japan. This dynamic has dramatically shifted over the last 12 months. The spread between the US Treasury 10yr bond and the equivalent JGB has narrowed considerably since late 2024. Yet, the Yen has continued to weaken (one would generally expect to see the two lines in the chart below move in opposite directions):

The Bank of Japan has begun aggressively shrinking its balance sheet, reversing some of the quantitative easing of the COVID period, and allowing bond rates to rise as the ‘yield curve control’ policy has been largely abandoned:

Meanwhile, the US Federal Reserve has stopped its quantitative tightening, taking pressure off US rates.

This has led the spread between the Japanese and US benchmark 10-year bond rates to fall to the slimmest margin since February 2022, when the Yen traded at the 115 level.

The fundamental reason that rate spreads should drive currency movements, assuming equal inflation in each country, is that money tends to flow to where it gets the best return – adjusted for other investor expectations around growth and geopolitical risks. Holding other things equal, increasing rates in Japan while they remain flat in the US should lead to more marginal demand for Japanese yen.

The offsets to this rate dynamic are those mentioned above, plus potentially the disruptive impact to the energy market from the Iran war and Strait of Hormuz closure further hurting Japan’s trade balance and ability to produce manufactured goods due to shortages of key inputs. On the latter point, it is interesting that we did not see the Yen strengthen in the period when the Strait opened to transit – in fact, it kept going the other way, and weakened past the level at which the Japanese Ministry of Finance previously intervened in the currency market by selling ~$72bn of USD.

Further, Japan’s government debt to GDP ratio has been falling thanks to nominal GDP growth – the only major economy where this is the case. The government also plans to return to a primary surplus (ie: before interest payments) in 2027.

Japan’s headline government debt is obviously large, but when one considers that the BoJ (owned by the government) owns more than 40% of the outstanding, the net debt is considerably lower.

Further distorting comparisons between countries, Japan’s massive Government Pension Investment Fund owns assets worth another 40% of GDP, offsetting much of Japan’s future social security liabilities. Contrast this with the US, where unfunded entitlements amount to $78trn – or 244% of GDP, with only $2.9trn pre-funded!

The Japanese government also owns significant stakes in many other key assets, such as Japan Post, telco NTT Docomo, and institutions like the Development Bank of Japan, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and Japan Finance Corporation. The Bank of Japan also owns around 7% of the entire Japanese stock market via ETFs – worth around US$532bn, or another 12% of GDP.

None of this by itself causes the market’s perception of the Yen to change or for flows to reverse. So what may do so?

The most obvious answer is simply this – time. Major trends often take time to lose momentum and start their reversal. A current example of this dynamic is the observable beginnings of a crash in the Australian residential real estate market. The boom was ignited by ultra-low rates during COVID, but continued even as headline mortgage rates hit 6% in 2023. Rates now are at a similar level, but it took around three years for the higher rates to cause house prices to fall – assisted by the Strait of Hormuz impact on energy prices, and some questionable policies of the Labour government.

A second answer is suggested by Somerset Webb in her recent article, citing comments by Japan’s Finance Minister:

“…look to Finance Minister Satsuki Katayama’s comments this week. Perhaps, she said, now might be a good time to encourage local investors, and the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) in particular, to bring money home. This would be some reversal. Pre-Shinzo Abe’s devaluation drive, the GPIF held 60% of its assets in domestic bonds. Now it is more like 25%.”

How much demand for Yen could a potential shift create?

“If the GPIF went back up to around 30% exposure, companies returned to the levels they held a decade ago and retail investors redirected two years’ worth of investment in foreign equities instead to domestic equities, you get to around $400-450 billion of repatriation. That’s 10% of GDP, and just as it was a “game changer for the Japanese yen” (pushing it down) on the way out, it would be one on the way in (pushing it back up again).”

Whether this occurs or not is uncertain, but the government’s jawboning certainly indicates that the GPIF may face pressure to alter its allocations.

Finally, nuclear power plants are coming back online, with Prime Minister Takaichi a staunch supporter of accelerating the restarts. From her policy speech to the Diet:

“Public and private sector entities will work in concert to accelerate the restarting of nuclear power plants whose safety has been confirmed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority. We will also press forward in bringing into concrete form the development and deployment of next-generation advanced reactors, aiming to construct replacement power plants within the nuclear power plant sites of operators possessing nuclear power plants that have been slated for decommissioning”

So what does this mean for investors, and particularly those with exposure to Japanese equities?

If the Yen strengthens, investors will likely benefit from owning domestic-facing businesses with dollar-denominated inputs that benefit from a stronger yen. Conversely, investors in the large cap-dominated indices such as the Nikkei or Topix will likely face headwinds, as most of these companies are either major exporters or earn a large portion of their profits outside Japan.

A strengthening Yen makes exports less competitive, and reduces reported overseas profits on translation back to Yen.

Key Takeaways:

  • Investors may wish to consider being long the Yen directly as strengthening seems likely
  • If the Yen strengthens, it will likely benefit domestic-facing companies and hurt large-cap multi-nationals
  • If you’re planning a trip to Japan, book sooner rather than later!
Senjin Capital Fund I is invested in asset-rich domestic-facing Japanese companies that likely
benefit if the yen strengthens.
........
This material is for general information only and is not an offer for the purchase or sale of any financial product or service. The material has been prepared by Senjin Capital Pty Ltd and Senjin Asset Management Pty Ltd for investors who qualify as wholesale clients under sections 761G of the Corporations Act or to any other person who is not required to be given a regulated disclosure document under the Corporations Act. The material is not intended to provide you with financial or tax advice and does not take into account your objectives, financial situation or needs.  Although we believe that the material is correct, no warranty of accuracy, reliability or completeness is given, except for liability under statute which cannot be excluded. Please note that past performance may not be indicative of future performance and that no guarantee of performance, the return of capital or a particular rate of return is given by 62C, Senjin Capital, Senjin Asset Management, any of their related body corporates or any other person. To the maximum extent possible, 62C, Senjin, their related body corporates or any other person do not accept any liability for any statement in this material. Senjin Capital Pty Ltd (CAR #001314185) and Senjin Asset Management Pty Ltd (CAR #001314259) are both corporate authorised representatives of 62 Consulting Pty Ltd (AFS License 548573). This presentation does not constitute or form a part of any offer or solicitation to purchase or subscribe for securities in the United States. The securities referred to herein or offered in connection with this presentation have not been, and will not be, registered under the Securities Act. They may not be offered, sold, transferred, distributed or delivered, directly or indirectly within, into or in the United States except pursuant to an exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements of the Securities Act. No public offering of the securities will take place in the United States. Neither the US Securities and Exchange Commission nor any securities regulatory authority of any state or other jurisdiction of the United States has approved or disapproved of an investment in the securities or passed on the accuracy or adequacy of the contents of this presentation. Any representation to the contrary is a criminal offence in the United States. This presentation is directed at This presentation contains forward‐looking statements. These statements may include the words “believe”, “expect”, “anticipate”, “intend”, “plan”, “estimate”, “project”, “will”, “may”, “targeting” and similar expressions as well as statements other than statements of historical facts including, without limitation, those regarding the financial position, business strategy, plans, targets and objectives of the management of the Company for future operations (including development plans and objectives). Such forward‐looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other important factors which may affect the Company's ability to implement and achieve the economic and monetary policies, budgetary plans, fiscal guidelines and other development benchmarks set out in such forward‐looking statements and which may cause actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such forward‐looking statements. Such forward‐looking statements are based on numerous assumptions regarding the Company’s present and future policies and plans and the environment in which the Company will operate in the future. Furthermore, certain forward‐looking statements are based on assumptions or future events which may not prove to be accurate, and no reliance whatsoever should be placed on any forward-looking statements in this presentation. The forward‐looking statements in this presentation speak only as of the date of this presentation, and the Company expressly disclaims to the fullest extent permitted by law any obligation or undertaking to disseminate any updates or revisions to any forward‐looking statements contained herein to reflect any change in expectations with regard thereto or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statements are based. Nothing in the foregoing is intended to or shall exclude any liability for, or remedy in respect of, fraudulent misrepresentation. The information in this presentation has not been independently verified. No representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to the fairness, accuracy or completeness of the presentation and the information contained herein and no reliance should be placed on it. Information in this presentation (including market data and statistical information) has been obtained from various sources (including third party sources) and the Company does not guarantee the accuracy or completeness of such information. All projections, valuations and statistical analyses are provided for information purposes only. They may be based on subjective assessments and assumptions and may use one among alternative methodologies that produce different results and to the extent they are based on historical information, any they should not be relied upon as an accurate prediction of future performance. Any financial data in this presentation are solely for your information, as background to the Company and may not be relied upon for the purpose of entering into any transaction whatsoever. The financial information set out in this presentation is based on certain important assumptions and adjustments and does not purport to represent what our results of operations are on an audited basis or actually will be in any future periods. Furthermore, no representation is made as to the reasonableness of the assumptions made in this presentation or the accuracy or completeness of any modelling, scenario analysis or back‐testing. The information in this presentation is not intended to predict actual results and no assurances are given with respect thereto. None of the Company, its advisers, connected persons or any other person accepts any liability whatsoever for any loss howsoever arising, directly or indirectly, from this presentation or its contents. All information, opinions and estimates contained herein are given as of the date hereof and are subject to change without notice. Conflicts of interest. Senjin, and their respective related bodies corporate, directors, officers, employees and associates may hold, acquire or dispose of direct or indirect interests in securities, financial products, portfolio companies or other investments referred to in this material, including investments also held or considered by the Senjin Capital Fund I. They may also receive fees or other benefits in connection with those interests. These circumstances may give rise to actual, potential or perceived conflicts of interest. Relevant conflicts are managed in accordance with applicable law and the conflicts-management arrangements of Senjin.

James Halse, CFA
Managing Director & CIO
Senjin Capital

Jamie is the founder & CIO of Senjin Capital, Australia's only fund manager focused on using shareholder activism to unlock the deep value in Japanese publicly-listed small cap companies. Prior to founding Senjin in 2024, Jamie spent 13 years...

I would like to

Only to be used for sending genuine email enquiries to the Contributor. Livewire Markets Pty Ltd reserves its right to take any legal or other appropriate action in relation to misuse of this service.

Personal Information Collection Statement
Your personal information will be passed to the Contributor and/or its authorised service provider to assist the Contributor to contact you about your investment enquiry. They are required not to use your information for any other purpose. Our privacy policy explains how we store personal information and how you may access, correct or complain about the handling of personal information.

Comments

Sign In or Join Free to comment
The 10th annual Livewire Live 2026

One room. One day. The minds that move markets.

22 September 2026 Art Gallery of NSW, Sydney

Register Now